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In the implementation of an ERP system in a large Danish production company  (here 
referred to as Omega), discourse surrounding the project changed appreciably during 
the course of the project. Drawing on recent adaptations of discourse theory, we 
provide a theoretical model which relates technological discourse to actions and 
outcomes.  The model provides a theoretical explanation for how one dominant 
technological discourse in an organisation can be replaced by another.  The ERP 
implementation at Omega was originally cast as a classical IT project (reflecting the 
dominant ways of thinking about system development and project management both in 
industry and academia); however, the experience of the project clearly changed the 
sense-making of the participants and the implementation later came to be regarded as 
an technology-driven organisational change initiative. The new technological 
discourse helped the organisational actors to perceive value in what they were doing.  
However, it also has many implications for practice in large IT implementations, and 
some of these are elaborated. 
Introduction 
The software engineering approach to information systems development (Pressman, 
2000; Sommerville, 2000; Pfleeger, 2001), in association with structured methods 
(Martin, 1986; Weaver, 1992) and the more recent generation of object-oriented 
development methods (Coad and Yourdon, 1990), remains the most significant 
influence on contemporary systems development. Many other influences (prototyping, 
RAD, extreme programming) share the same primarily technical standpoint.  Given 
the nature of the discipline, a technical standpoint is reasonable and inevitable, but 
many commentators have pointed out that it tends to exclude or minimise many other 
important factors: social, cultural, political, semantic, managerial and so on.  Two of 
the sharpest and best elaborated critiques of this standpoint come from Checkland and 
Hirschheim et al.  Rudy Hirschheim and colleagues (Hirschheim and Klein, 1989, 
1992) developed paradigmatic analysis of ISD based on Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
well-known analysis of social science.  In this analysis, the technical standpoint is 
functionalist (characterized by objectivism and social order). Without necessarily 
making it explicit, technically-based approaches imply an ontology of realism and an 
epistemology of positivism. The method of natural science is evoked, though many of 
the phenomena involved are social, and technical rationality (as in the phrase 
‘software engineering’) is dominant.  Typically, structured methods aim to reduce 
 
1 means uncertainty by the linear stepwise development characteristic of the system 
development lifecycle approach. Goals (the why) are assumed to be obvious or 
predetermined; the principal legitimisation is technological and economic (profit 
maximisation) supporting the interests of management and their representatives - 
system developers. Organisations, the context of development, are taken to be 
machine-like (Morgan, 1986).  The analyst is a technological expert enacting the story 
of modernism; user participation is often minimal.  The objective reality of the ‘object 
systems’ studied, which characteristically exclude the social, political or cultural, is 
assumed, and representational models of reality are constructed.  Phenomena, 
represented by measurable variables, are assumed to be causally related; meaning is 
assumed to be denotational, rather than socially constructed. The ‘one true set of 
requirements’ waits to be uncovered by rational analysis. In Checkland’s (Checkland, 
1981; Checkland and Scholes, 1990) analysis, the technical standpoint corresponds to 
hard systems thinking.  For hard systems thinkers, systems exist in the world and have 
an external reality independent of the observer.  Analysts optimise solutions to well-
defined problems, addressing the ‘how’ rather than the ‘why.’ Systems models are 
models ‘of’’ the world, i.e. representational. Human behaviour is assumed to be 
essentially goal-seeking, rather than relationship-maintaining.   
This technical standpoint is inseparable from classical project management.   
Here linear, phase-oriented, time delimited change exercises, planned beforehand 
through rational analysis, and strictly controlled against time schedules and budgets, 
lead to financial gains for the company (Weis and Wysocki, 1994; McCarthy, 1995; 
McConnell, 1998).  If one combines a technicist account of systems development with 
classical project management, a familiar form of organisational endeavour can be 
identified – the classical IT project. 
For many larger organisations in the last ten years, system development has 
come to focus on a particular topic: the implementation of ERP systems.  ERP 
systems are pre-programmed, and the major activities are not conventional systems 
analysis, design and programming, but system configuration, implementation and 
organisational development. Organisations often set up a classical IT project to 
introduce an ERP system, but these implementations are beset with many problems 
(Holland and Light, 1999; Davenport, 2000; Markus et al., 2000; Ross and Vitale, 
2000; Shanks et al., 2000).  In the organisation we studied, a Danish production 
company here referred to as Omega, sense-making around the ERP implementation 
started with classical IT project-thinking, but evolved into an entirely different 
perspective.  We use a model of discontinuous shifts in sense-making derived from 
discourse theory to help study these phenomena, and to specify the characteristics of 
the new discourse, which we call ‘technology-driven organisational change initiative.’  
We identify some implications for practice from this way of characterizing large 
computer system implementations which can help in similar endeavours.  
Methodology 
The research method can be classified as a longitudinal in-depth interpretive 
ethnographic study, and the philosophical base is critical hermeneutics (Myers, 1997).  
Critical hermeneutics recognize that the history and context are important factors to 
take into account when trying to understand social phenomena.  The data was 
collected in accordance with these principles between January 1996 and January 
2001, using detailed observation of actions in the field and unstructured interviews.  
One of the researchers observed (but did not participate in) all the ERP management 
meetings, as well as daily work within the organisation and training classes.   
 
2 Observations and unstructured interviews were supplemented with informal social 
contact with the participants, and review of written materials.  Interviews were 
conducted at all levels of the organisation - with senior managers, the ERP manager, 
members of the implementation group, the internal consultant, superusers and regular 
users.  The unstructured interviews were carried out in two rounds - the first in spring 
1996, and the second in autumn 1997 (more than six months after the ERP system 
implementation). Unstructured interviews with the project managers continued 
throughout the research period. Sense-making of the ERP project was found to have 
changed at the second round of interviews.   
  Walsham (1995), following Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989), suggests that theory 
may be involved in an interpretive study in three ways: 
1.  As an initial guide to design and data collection 
2.  As part of an iterative process of data collection and interpretation 
3.  As a final product of the research. 
In this research, discourse theory was used as part of an iterative process of data 
collection and interpretation, and also forms part of the final product of the research.  
The focus was on discourse as descriptive theory rather than discourse analysis as a 
research method.  Taken together, the developed theoretical model and the analysis of 
the empirical situation allow a defensible interpretation of the events of the case 
study.  There may be a problem in generalizing from case study research, where depth 
is substituted for breadth, but Walsham (1995) suggests that four types of 
generalization are possible.  Concepts may be developed, or theory may be generated.  
‘Specific implications in particular domains of action’ may be drawn; such 
generalizations are often formulated as tendencies rather than predictions. Learning 
from interpretative case studies may also be of a less focused nature, which is not well 
described by the preceding categories; Walsham terms this learning ‘rich insight.’   
  The study seeks to develop a specific explanation of a set of phenomena (the 
change in sense making at Omega) in a particular domain (ERP implementation) and 
to show how one familiar discourse about IT projects was replaced by another, less 
familiar one.  It further seeks to explore the practical consequences of the new 
discourse (the way the organisation members eventually came to understand their 
ERP implementation).  This explanation remains, however, a theoretical explanation 
of one particular situation, and further research would be necessary to generalize to 
other situations.  
Discontinuous shifts in technology discourses 
Discourse 
The word ‘discourse’ is widely used, but often imprecisely defined. Our use of the 
term is consistent with Edwards (1995): 
‘the entire field of signifying or meaningful practices: those social 
interactions – material, institutional and linguistic – through which 
reality is interpreted and constructed for us and with which human 
knowledge is produced and reproduced.  A discourse, then, is a way of 
knowledge, a background of assumptions and agreements about how 
reality is to be interpreted and expressed’ (Edwards, 1995 p.34) 
However, our theoretical stance should be allied with what Heracleous and Barrett 
call the ‘critical’ stream of management discourse research.  Following Foucault 
(Foucault, 1972), ‘scholars taking this approach have conceptualized discourse as 
power/knowledge relations, linguistically communicated, historically located, and 
embedded in social practice’ (Heracleous and Barrett, 2001).  Discourse studies 
 
3 involve descriptions of ’cultural influences, traditions continuities……internal 
coherences, axioms, deductive connections, compatibilities;’ temporarily stabilized 
patterns of concepts, statements and their relationships (Foucault, 1972).  We 
understand discourse as the way in which an action, a social interaction, a practice, a 
phenomenon or speech act is interpreted and understood.  Social actors need 
discourses to organize their world.  Discourses are made up of rules and procedures, 
that help construct and legitimate the way actors see things and talk about them.   
Discourses legitimate certain statements and communicational practices, while 
invalidating others (Casey, 1995).  Discourses are located in practice, and created and 
recreated through interaction between actors.   
Whilst Foucault studied broad historical trends (archaeologies), organisational 
scholars have often concentrated on more localized discourses.  Alvesson (2000), for 
instance, distinguishes between four different levels of discourse: Micro-Discourse 
(relating to individual actors), Discourse-Near relating to a groups of actors, Grand-
Discourse (the discourse of the organisation) and Mega-Discourse (relating to the 
ruling or dominant discourse at the regional, national or international level).  All 
levels of discourse are emergent and can evolve over time.  When a discourse 
becomes established, it may disappear into the background, becoming more tacit and 
implicit – an unacknowledged backdrop for understanding and practice.   
Many discourses will normally co-exist within an organisation, and actors will 
have different discursive orientations, moving between discourses appropriate to 
different social groups and different situations.  Actors may orient themselves 
consciously or unconsciously towards different (even competing) discourses.  They 
may ‘bypass the diverse discourses in favour of common action’ (Borenreider, 1998); 
put there own discourses in the background in order to interact with other actors in a 
meaningful and understandable way, perhaps to achieve a temporary goal.  Discourses 
are regarded as being fluid and overlapping, and not a priori bound to social groups, 
organisational departments or organisational levels.  Material objects (such as 
computer systems) and their interpretation do not stand independent of discourse, and 
are understood through discourse.  It follows that they may be understood differently 
by actors interpreting them through different discourses. 
Technology discourse 
For Foucault, discourse were primary topic-based (madness, sexuality, 
psychoanalysis, prison reform).  Orlikowski and Gash (1994) use the term 
technological frame to identify the assumptions, expectations and knowledge 
organisation members use to understand technology.  This is the ‘understanding 
members of a social group come to have of particular technological artefacts’, 
including ‘not only the technology itself, but the specific conditions, applications, and 
consequences of that technology in particular contexts’.  They go on to analytically 
identify a number of technology frames held by different social groups or 
communities of practice in an organisation, which may be congruent, in the extent to 
which they converge and agree, or incongruent if they differ substantially.  Groups 
take actions consistent with their technological frames.  Like discourses, frames are 
likely to be ‘self-reinforcing, even to the point of rejecting knowledge that does not fit 
their system of meaning’ (Orlikowski and Gash, 1994) and are not necessarily self-
consistent.  We therefore identify ‘technology discourses’ as discourses pertaining to 
a technology or computer system, whether at an individual, group, organisational or 
societal level. 
   
 
4 Discourse transformation 
According to Foucault, discourse, being both medium and outcome of social practice, 
is emergent and subject to flux and change.  He distinguishes transformation (‘the 
derivation of new rules of (discursive) formation on the basis of rules that are already 
in operation’ from discontinuous change (‘the substitution of one discursive formation 
for another’ (Foucault, 1972).  In the critical tradition of discourse theory, 
organisational change has often been associated with a dialectical process of thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis – the reconciliation of contradictory or opposing discursive 
forces (Ford and Ford, 1995).  Dialectic (though not named as such) can be seen at 
work in Orlikowski and Gash’s incongruent technological frames, and the competing 
technology discourses of empowerment and control identified by Hayes and Walsham 
(Hayes and Walsham, 2000) in their study of a Notes implementation at Compound 
UK.  
Theoretical model: dominant technological discourses and action - 
discontinuous shifts in sense-making 
The discourse space represents the sum total of the many available discourses.   
Technological discourse is discourse carried on around, and principally concerning a 
technological object, here primarily an information system.  Technological discourses 
do not exist in isolation from other discourse (for instance society-wide discourse), 
but relate and respond to them.  The dominant technological discourse represents the 
way of thinking which predominantly guides decision-making and the taking of 
action.  This may reflect how widely the dominant technological discourse is held, but 
may also reflect the power of those who adopt it.  It also provides the frame through 
which action and outcomes are interpreted and fed back into the shared 
understanding.  The dominant technological discourse will normally co-exist with 
complementary or competing technological discourses – alternative sense-making 
systems which people use, but primarily to critique or challenge the dominant sense-
making.  The dominant technical discourse leads to actions (for instance, the purchase 
of a computer system) and outcomes (for instance the annual company results).  We 
do not mean to imply some simple linear causal chain of decisions, actions and 
outcomes (though this may be a feature of some organisational discourse which is 
used to interpret these factors).  However, a dominant technological discourse will 
legitimate some actions and invalidate others, and is thus likely to produce a 
multidimensional pattern of related actions (such as an IT project, the hiring of expert 
consultants, project management activities, budgets etc.).  There will also be a multi 
dimensional pattern of intended and unintended outcomes (such as accounts, 
hardware and software installations, new process descriptions, new hires and 
redundancies, user satisfaction and resistance).  The attribution of cause and effect to 
actions and outcomes is seen as primarily interpretive and located at the level of 
discourse.  Actions and outcomes can be interpreted as congruent or incongruent with 
the dominant technological discourse.  A pattern of minor incongruities is likely to 
reinforce the dominant discourse (for instance, a project which is perceived as poorly 
controlled and misses its deadlines is likely to lead to calls for better control).   
However, repeated major incongruities open the way for other discourses, which offer 
more consistent sense-making.  These may then become, at least temporarily, the 
dominant discourse.  These processes could also be described as dialectical, in that 
they involve challenges to conventional ways of thinking and the resolution of those 
challenges. 
  This process should also be seen in relation to other important discourses.  The 
 
5 major factor in the rise and fall of a dominant technological discourse may not be 
consistency, but comfort in the light of more important discourses.  Thus an IT project 
which badly affects a company’s profitability may need to be re-interpreted in the 
managerial discourse.  Congruence between perceptions of actions and outcomes and 
the dominant technological discourse is likely to result in re-enactment of 
technological practice.  Major incongruence is likely to result in transformation of 
technological practice.  This change process could be labelled a discontinuity, 
following Foucault’s practice.  The theoretical model is represented diagrammatically 




























Figure 1.  Theoretical model: dominant technological discourse and action 
The implementation of SAP at Omega 
ERP systems in Denmark 
Omega began its ERP journey in 1995.  At that time, in common with many other 
companies, its experience with ERP systems was relatively small, the IT function was 
primarily seen as technical, and IT systems had traditionally been developed to 
support existing procedures and processes.  ERP systems, however, were different; 
they provided the opportunity for organisations to develop their procedures around the 
best practice ideas built into the systems.  Implementing ERP systems therefore often 
requires considerable organisational change (Kohn, 1996).  The modular concept (one 
central database underlying many different modules supporting different 
organisational functions) was regarded as rather radical.  Interest in ERP systems 
began to grow in Denmark in the early 1990s and sales continued for the rest of the 
decade.  The demand for consultants and technical experts with experience with ERP 
systems was high.  In 1996 and 1997 the newspapers and the trade press praised these 
systems, reporting success stories about how the implementation of ERP systems had 
 
6 contributed to efficiency and cost-saving.  In 1998 85% of the ERP companies said 
that they were pleased with their implementation, and 15% had got more than they 
had expected (Deloitte Touche (1998)).  Danish companies had therefore no reason at 
that time to doubt that the implementation of an ERP system would improve 
performance and solve legacy system problems.  The first negative reports appeared 
at the beginning of 1998.  The Danish audio firm Bang and Olufsen sent a briefing to 
the Danish stock exchange and the newspapers reported its difficulties with 
implementing SAP, and its consequent poor financial results (B&O annual financial 
report (1998/99)).  Other stories followed.  A survey carried out in 2000 showed that 
92% of the companies that had implemented an ERP system were unsatisfied with the 
outcome of the implementation and felt that the system had not lived up to their 
expectations (PA Consulting, (2000).  Sales of ERP system fell in 2001-2 (partly 
because of market maturity and the disappearance of the Y2K problem), many ERP 
implementation consultants lost their jobs and the demand for ERP skills decreased.  
The market has now picked up again with the emergence of second-generation ERP 
systems. 
Omega 
Omega is a Danish multinational production company with more than 1000 
employees.  The company goes back more than 40 years, and is a significant player in 
both the Danish and the world markets.  In 1995 the parent company was divided into 
four different functional departments, each of which had their own management 
structure and was more or less autonomous.  The company had no tradition for 
outsourcing activities and was highly horizontally integrated.  IT systems were 
commissioned individually by the different departments and subsidiaries, that all had 
their own software solutions.  The IT department supported the different systems and 
departments with development, maintenance and updates.  The IT function’s skill 
base was technical, and it was seen as the prime owner of IT issues, but it had never 
developed solutions from scratch and normally responded to requirements set by the 
different departments.  As a result of strong growth in the beginning of the 1990s the 
company found it difficult to coordinate and manage processes across the different 
departments, and internal communication came to be regarded as insufficient.  In mid-
1995 the managing director felt a need for better control and coordination.  The idea 
of a new IT system was fostered.  The perceived need was for a system that enabled 
better coordination and integration of data, that was able to improve customer service 
and that would reduce the data entry effort. 
The ERP implementation 
An ERP solution was chosen at Omega because of its advertised ability to integrate 
the different departments and functions.  The reasons given were the high level of 
functionality and the flexibility built into the different modules.  A limited selection of 
modules were seen as having the potential to fulfil the company's needs, and Omega 
could add other modules later if they became necessary.  A team consisting of the 
production manager, one employee from the sales department and the IT manager was 
set up, and they spent three months investigating the ERP market for the system that 
would fulfil Omega’s need.  The field was narrowed down to two, and the directors 
opted for SAP R/3 in January 1996.  In February 1996 the implementation decision 
was taken at board level.  A team of five middle line managers (one from each of the 
company’s departments plus the IT manager) was appointed as the project team to be 
responsible for the implementation.  The IT manager was appointed project manager.  
A steering committee was appointed consisting of senior managers.  The team was to 
 
7 make a project plan for the implementation containing goals, organizing principles, 
milestones and budgets.  The project manager’s principal responsibilities were: 
1.  responsibility for management and coordination of the project 
2.  development of the project plan 
3.  leading the steering committee 
4.  arranging and chairing the project group meetings 
5.  reporting significant financial and time deviations in the project 
6.  continuous monitoring of the budget versus resources used: hours used, 
expenses, expected remaining expenses for completion of the project 
It was decided to keep the implementation in-house and to build up internal ERP 
experience with the help of specialist external consultants.  The chosen SAP modules 
were sales and distribution, material and production planning, and finance.  The 
modules were to be implemented in all departments within the company: a big bang, 
or large footprint strategy.  The go live date was set to January 1
st 1997.   
The project plan specified that the implementation process should run until the 
system was in normal use in the main company’s operations.  Further projects would 
then be set up to implement SAP in the subsidiary companies during 1998.  No further 
consideration about the development of SAP was taken, besides that the IT 
department (which was very technically-oriented) should be responsibly for the 
technical maintenance of the system, as it had been for previous systems.   
During the first couple of months of the implementation, the meetings in the 
project group were characterized by confusion.  Members expressed loyalties to their 
own departments, had difficulties making decisions and meetings were always longer 
than planned.  The members of the project group began to question the IT manager’s 
ability to manage the implementation, and to express discontent with the way he 
communicated to the steering committee.  According to one of the members:  
”When we are having meetings in the project group and we agree on an 
issue, the project manager later says something different to the steering 
committee, just to please them.  This is very confusing for us.   
Additionally he doesn’t understand what the implementation  is really 
about, he is only able to discuss the technical issues” (Project Steering 
Group member, spring, 1996). 
The project manager also became unhappy: he suggested that 
“the implementation of SAP, is more business development than system 
development, and requires a manager allocated 100% to the 
implementation” (first project manager, spring 1996). 
He immediately hired an SAP consultant (a technical expert who had been involved in 
many implementations around the world before settling in Denmark) to help the 
project group.  A month later the consultant became the project manager, allocated 
full time to the project.  Project meetings became much more incisive and now 
focused on describing business processes.  The focus of the project changed from 
visionary discussions of future business possibilities, to practical concerns related to 
going live on the due date.  The project moved on rapidly, and the business case was 
finished by the end of June 1996.   
SAP goes live 
The first three months after going live were characterized as chaotic.  Many 
employees were unable to use the system and others keyed in wrong data.  Many of 
the newly designed processes were not adopted, and unforeseen complications arose 
with others.  The result was a large backlog of production orders, with many late 
deliveries.   
 
8   The majority of the implementation group saw their first priority as sorting out 
the many glitches and problems and achieving smooth running and operation of the 
modules that had been implemented.  However, those working with SAP on a daily 
basis and the project manager were keen to expand the system and/or add new 
functionalities if they could improve the system’s operational performance.  As the 
project manager commented 
“we know that SAP would never be used without problems, there will 
always be things that we want to change or new functionalities we would 
like to add.  SAP is constantly releasing new products, which would be of 
interest to us.” (second project manager, spring 1997).  
The implementation team often disagreed about what problems they should solve, 
why and when they should solve them, and whether the implementation had been a 
success.  Two of the team members frequently expressed their discontent with the 
implementation and the system, considering the ongoing implementation to be the 
result of a top management decision, rather than because the system contributed to the 
performance of the organisation.  The financial result for 1997 was a deficit, the first 
in the history of the company.  The managing director publicly attributed half of the 
deficit to the new SAP system.  Despite this, managers were apparently satisfied with 
their work.  The ERP system, they claimed, had made the company aware of weak 
spots in company processes, and was now seen as a potential strategic tool and 
catalyst for organisational change.  According to the project manager the 
implementation was a success since:  
“it has given the company a tool to find out where it will be beneficial to 
make changes.  The ERP system is a tool we can use to analyse the 
problems we have, but of course it doesn’t solve the problems” (second 
project manager, autumn 1997). 
The outcomes of the ERP journey came as a surprise to many of the employees.  
Towards the end of 1997 the finance director expressed it this way: 
“I am surprised how huge this implementation has become, and how 
much it has changed our company.  I was not aware of that before the 
implementation started, and it came as a surprise.  But I have to say, if I 
had known, I would have made the same decision to day” (finance 
director, autumn 1997). 
A year after the system became operational, the second project manager resigned 
from his job.  He didn’t think he could do more in the organisation, and he had 
experienced resistance towards the system and his work, both from users and 
directors.  A third project manager was appointed.  He saw the IT system as 
something that should support operations in the organisation but at the same time he 
had the opinion that the system and the abilities within it, should be used – the system 
should be expanded wherever it would contribute positively to the performance of the 
organisation.  The new project manager said that he regarded the implementation as:  
“a continuous process.  It’s not a project, which is a matter of solving 
problems, after which everything will run smoothly.  But I do not think 
either the managing directors or the members of the implementation 
team understand it in this way.  Maybe they will soon, I don´t know” 
(third project manager, February 1998).  
and, regarding the project group:  
“in the future I expect that the implementation team will continue to 
meet, but not every week as today, try to keep the meeting very informal 
and at the same time involve the managing directors more.  The aim for 
 
9 me is then to try to convince the rest of the organisation that the 
implementation of SAP will not end.  Because it is necessary to convince 
them, since not all employees have that understanding” (third project 
manager, February 1998). 
Looking back at the implementation (autumn 1998) 
Despite being well over budget, and well past the deadlines (at least in the subsidiary 
companies), the ERP system is today generally considered a success and the Omega’s 
managers cannot imagine the company without SAP.  The managing director reflected 
back on the choice of system: 
“SAP was the most expensive and therefore probably also the best.  It 
was very difficult for us as managing directors to know what we said yes 
to, since we had limited understanding of the systems (managing director, 
autumn 1997).   
And on the implementation: 
“…..to be honest I have been quite surprised how huge this 
implementation has become, and I don’t think it will end; as new modules 
are introduced, then the hardware has to be bigger.” (managing director, 
autumn 1997).   
However, when the sales and marketing director was asked to reflect of the 
implementation of SAP he said: 
“I don’t think that the project manager was tough enough to do what it 
takes.  I think that we started out too early, and in 1996 we should have 
planned it better” (sales and marketing director, autumn 1997). 
Further developments 
The third project manager was promoted to IT manager for the whole 
organisation.  The IT department’s function thereby changed from being solely 
technical, to being both technical and business oriented.  At the end of 1999 the 
employees who had worked fulltime with the SAP system were relocated to different 
departments to perform additional user skills building and alignment of the system 
with business needs.  The new IT manager became involved in Omega’s strategic 
planning process and the work of the business development department.  Work in 
relation to the SAP system is now concentrated on reconfiguring the system when 
necessary, taking in new functionalities and modules to improve the business 
performance, upgrading the system, implementing SAP in subsidiaries (which took 
two years longer than originally planned and ended in late 2000). 
Changing sense-making at Omega – analysis of the ERP 
implementation 
In the early days of the ERP planning process, the implementation was clearly thought 
of as a rather conventional IT project.  The procurement activities were handled as 
with earlier IT systems: identification of requirements, surveying the range of 
products and comparing price and functionality.  The implementation was set up as a 
project, with a command structure, responsibilities, budgets and time schedules.  The 
assumption was that the implementation of SAP would end, stable functioning of the 
new system would be achieved, at which point the project would finish and the 
implementation team be disbanded.  Maintenance of the installed system would then 
be undertaken by the IT department.  There was no prior consideration of 
organisational change; in particular process change which might be the result of the 
best practice models embodied in the software.  It was assumed that the ERP system 
 
10 had been chosen to meet the needs of the company, not that the company would have 
to change in order to fit in with the software.  This discourse (most evident at the 
earlier round of data collection) characterizes the ERP implementation as a classical 
IT project, which can and should be planned in advance and run like other IT projects.  
In this frame, the ERP system is viewed as an administrative tool which should 
support existing processes and procedures.  It is necessary and possible to allocate 
resources to the project in advance, and the appropriate managerial style is command 
and control.  Managerial decisions about the implementation project can and should 
be based on rational analysis.  The managerial objectives should be to bring the 
project in on time and on budget, and to realise a quick return on investment through 
efficiency gains. 
  An alternative sense-making strategy can be seen gradually asserting itself, and 
is much more pronounced in the later round of interviews.  The chief executive’s 
retrospective reflections indicate that the system was of sufficient scope and 
complexity to make it virtually impossible for decision-makers to understand what the 
implications for the company would be.  It could not therefore be rationally analysed 
or planned.  Now the scope of the implementation is seen as much wider (the finance 
director comments on the wide impact of the system), and several actors expect it to 
be an evolutionary process, not a time-delimited finite one.  The project manager 
explicitly dissociates the implementation from the conventional idea of a project.   
Process and business issues are very much on the agenda (this is the ‘business 
development’ that features in project meetings).  The role of the project manager has 
changed (he now sees his role as education and facilitation), and his success criteria 
are re-defined as the ability to learn about the operation of the company, rather than 
directly solving the company’s problems, or contributing to efficiency.  The role of 
the IT department also changes, becoming less technically focused, and less project-
oriented.  SAP is at the heart of the company’s improvement initiatives.  In the new 
discourse the implementation is seen as a technology-driven organisational change 
initiative.  Here the ERP system has become strategic and tightly coupled to business 
practice, an enabler of change which can be evaluated in terms of learning and 
information benefits.  Its implementation is evolutionary and on-going, responding to 
changing circumstances and the demands of the system itself, and involves a wide 
range of the organisation’s members.  The two technological discourses are set out in 
Table 1. 
  The theoretical model in Figure 1 focuses on the relationship between sense-
making, action, and outcomes.  The decisions and actions taken at the early stage of 
the implementation (for example the selection of system, organisation of the project 
and choice of project manager) are largely consistent with the dominant classical IT 
project discourse.  However, if the implementation was largely viewed as a classical 
IT project, and planned and run after these principles, its perceived outcomes are 
difficult to interpret as successful using this frame of reference.  SAP’s introduction 
clearly caused major disruption to the normal running of the company and had a 
disastrous effect on its finances, at least in the short term.  Although the 
implementation went live on the scheduled date, at the insistence of management, 
there were many unresolved technical problems and resistance towards the use of the 
system (which meant that the project team could not be disbanded), and it was well 
over budget.  Subsequent implementations in the subsidiary companies ran into 
difficult problems and went many months over their deadlines.  Few of the success 
criteria were met, and if actions and the perceived outcomes of those actions were to 
be interpreted through the classical discourse, actors would have to conclude that the 
 
11 project was under-resourced, badly planned and poorly controlled, and that SAP was 
not successful at supporting the company’s processes and delivering efficiency 
savings.  Moreover, the managerial decision-making process leading to its adoption 
and subsequent continued support would come into question.  Indeed some actors did 
make at least some of those judgements based upon the older dominant discourse.  
Clearly these interpretations are difficult to sustain on an organisation-wide basis, and 
conflict badly with value systems in other discourses, such as the managerial 
discourse of responsibility, profit and shareholder value or the system developer’s 
discourse of engineering competence.  Interpretation of the pattern of actions and 
perceived consequences through the newer discourse is much more comfortable. 
  
 
12 Table 1.  Dominant technological discourses at Omega 
Discourse component  Technology discourse 1 – 
classical IT project 




Understanding of ERP 
implementation 
The implementation is a classic, 
time delimited project, which 
should be planned in advance 
and run like other projects 
The implementation is a 
evolutionary change process 
effecting organisational life, and 
should response to changing 
objectives, conditions and 
unfolding circumstances 
The role of the system  The ERP system is an 
administrative tool to support 
existing processes and 
procedures – IT supports 
business processes 
The ERP system is a strategic 
resource which facilitates 
changes in processes and 
procedures – IT drives process 
improvement 
Task for the implementation 
group 
Steering the project according to 
the planned scope and deadlines 
Combining business objectives 
with the ERP system to give the 
company a strategic advantage  
The implementation led by  Top management and the 
implementation group 
Corporate-wide employees 
Driving force for the 
implementation 
IT department led  IT department/executive led 
with user involvement 
Resource allocation  It is necessary and possible to 
allocate resources in advance 
Evolving resource needs 
dependent upon unforeseeable 
evolving conditions 
Management praxis  Command and control – top 
down 
Facilitation and inspiration – 
change agent 
Guiding logic  The implementation should be 
controlled according to rational 
analysis  
The implementation is complex 
and difficult to analyse, and 
therefore managed on evolving 
best guesses  
Success criteria  On time and on budget, 
efficiency gains 
Organisational learning and 
keeping the ERP system “alive” 
Scope and responsibilities  Middle managers responsible 
for technical projects, users 
need training 
Senior management responsible 
for coupling IT and business 
planning, wide active 
involvement from others 
Underlying change model  Linear phases  Iterative cycles 
 
Implications for practice 
Managing classical IT projects has been widely written about and is relatively well 
understood.  In this section we consider some of the practical implications of 
understanding a large computer system implementation as a technology-driven 
 
13 organisational change initiative.   
Scope 
The scope of an organisational change initiative is much wider than that of a classical 
project.  Changes to business processes, personnel, organisation structure and even 
meaning structures, values and assumptions may be expected as well as changes to 
software and hardware.  A conventional rhetoric such as aligning the business (or 
organisation) and the technology may be appropriate, but in the case of large pre-
programmed systems such as ERP systems, it may be expected that the organisation 
does as much aligning (changing) as the system itself.  The organisational actors 
involved may be very wide-ranging and their roles very different. 
Change 
Conventional linear change models (phases, resource allocation, deadlines, 
milestones) resonate well with command and control style management expectations, 
but are badly suited to large system implementations.  These are described much 
better by iterative models such as Orlikowski and Hofman’s (Orlikowski and Hofman, 
1997) (which includes cycles of anticipated, emergent and opportunity-based 
changes).  An ERP implementation should be seen as an evolutionary change process 
affecting organisational life, and should respond to changing objectives, conditions 
and unfolding circumstances.  It may require structural changes to the organisation 
(such as the establishment of an ERP competence centre and the re-focusing of the IT 
department).  In addition the ERP system itself implies or imposes certain 
organisational norms and processes which may be difficult to anticipate (Davenport, 
1998; Kallinikos, 2004; Rose and Jones, 2004).  This means that many aspects of the 
implementation journey may need to be rethought in the light of emerging 
understandings of the new system’s problems and potentials, and its alignment with 
practice and business goals. 
Planning 
Though conventional systems development and project management rely heavily on 
rational analysis, it is clear that the cognitive demands involved in analysing the fit 
between an extremely complex pre-programmed system and an even more complex 
organisation are extreme.  This is normally impossible to do before implementation, 
and a strategy of bounded rationality (‘good-enough’ decision making) (Simon, 1982) 
must be adopted.  When taken together with the emergent nature of the change, it has 
to be accepted that the implementation of a new ERP system cannot been planned in 
detail in advance.  That is not to say that planning is irrelevant, but that long-term 
planning can only be made in outline.  Much planning must necessarily be short-term 
with frequent (monthly) review cycles.  Review needs to include both single and 
double loop learning (Argyris et al., 1985): that is both monitoring of conformance to 
existing plans and also development of those plans towards emerging goals.  This 
iterative process of evolving plans, goals and action according to best guesses is 
referred to as total project management by Paton and McCalman (2000).  Planning 
cannot be confined to technical issues (typically hardware, software, training) but 
must include broader issues such as work-process re-organisation, staffing, and 
structural re-organisation.  Planning needs to accommodate both project-based (time-
delimited) forms of change, and structural (more permanent) changes, such as 





The management rhetoric of tight financial control is invariably heavily challenged by 
ERP system implementation.  Heavy costs for software and hardware can be doubled 
by consultancy costs.  Hidden costs such as organisational development costs and lost 
revenue due to missed deliveries are seldom recognized.  Many costs are not 
foreseeable.  We recommend, however, three budgetary strategies which can help: 
 
1.  Budget for organisational changes as well as hardware, software, consultancy 
and training.  It is probably unrealistic to acknowledge the true organisational 
development cost, but the costs are real and must somehow be accounted for. 
2.  Set up cost-centre finance for structural changes as well as project finance for 
one-off expenditures 
3.  Hold contingencies for unforeseen developments resulting from the new 
system interacting with organisational processes. 
 
Another problem is that management success criteria are often heavily tied to budget 
control and efficiency savings through process improvements and down-sizing.  The 
evolution of information, learning and standardisation goals can help offset undue 
reliance on financial goals.  
Staffing and roles 
Whereas a classical IT project can be sponsored by management, run by the IT 
department with a technical person as project leader, and take organisational members 
to be users in need of training, these roles are inadequate in technology-driven 
organisational change initiatives.  Implementation managers need to be effective 
change agents (Markus and Benjamin, 2003), and employ a range of personal, 
business and technological competences (Kræmmergaard and Rose, 2002).  They 
need to take a collaborator role (Block, 1981), solving problems collaboratively rather 
than acting as specialist experts, since resistance is often the people’s reaction to the 
change agent, not necessarily to the change itself (Lawrence, 1969).  Implementation 
managers also need to be aware of their role in the political processes of the 
organisation, and be credible communicators and negotiators.  Whereas some tasks 
such as application development, setting up the system, and coding of data, can be 
outsourced to external consultants or vendors, alignment and change management 
tasks should remain in-house, because this work involves organisational specific 
knowledge about business processes, culture and politics (Markus and Benjamin, 
2003).  The many difficulties with scope, planning and budgeting mean that strategic 
management has to be actively involved in goal setting, structural changes, planning 
revisions and evolving financial requirements.  Monitoring and controlling the work 
of the implementation group will not be enough.  The implementation group’s 
primary task is matching business processes with system configuration and the 
member of the group therefore needs to combine both operational and technical 
competences.  Many middle level managers need to be involved in planning 
development of day-to-day work in their respective areas, and system users need to be 
active problem solvers as they encounter unanticipated problems in the use of the new 
systems. 
Conclusion 
A technicist account of systems development accompanied by a technicist account of 
project management, giving rise to a technicist account of a classical IT project, could 
be described as a global (mega) dominant discourse in both the academic and the 
 
15 practitioner worlds.  The technical standpoint is associated (in Hirschheim and Klein’s 
analysis) with functionalism, and (in Checkland’s analysis) with hard systems 
thinking.  ERP implementations have, in the last ten years, constituted the most 
significant development effort that larger companies have been involved in.  Here the 
focus is not upon systems analysis and programming (the systems are pre-
programmed) but on system configuration, implementation and organisational 
development.  In the company we studied, the dominant technology discourse 
reflected the global discourse, so the ERP implementation project was conceived as a 
classical IT project.  However the experience of the implementation altered sense-
making, and the original dominant discourse was replaced by a new one, which 
allowed the organisational members to perceive the value of what they had done.  
Here the implementation took the character of a technology-driven organisational 
change initiative: evolutionary, complex, and concerned with organisational change as 
much as technical change.  Although our data relates to only one company we suggest 
that the second discourse resonates much better with the many accounts of ERP 
implementations in the literature.  We argue that this way of thinking has many 
practical implications for those involved in such projects, including scoping, change 
management, planning, budgeting, and staffing roles and responsibilities. 
Despite many challenges over the years in both academic and practitioner 
forums, the dominant technicist discourse surrounding systems development remains 
relatively unscathed.  We think that, at least in the area of complex system 
implementations, this discourse is dysfunctional and contributes to many practical and 
theoretical difficulties.  We hope this special issue contributes to dislodging it. 
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